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Predictive Electoral Trajectories
Calibrated probabilistic forecasting on international political cycles. No pre-packaged outcomes: the conclusion follows the analysis, it does not precede it.
IT · Forecasting probabilistico calibrato sui cicli politici internazionali. Niente esiti pre-confezionati: la conclusione segue l'analisi, non la precede.
Method · Metodo: OSINT + structural fundamentals
Output: P · falsifier · early-warning · Brier
Updated · Aggiornato: 29.05.2026
What it is — and what it is not · Cos'è — e cosa non è
It is: aggregation and calibrated probabilistic forecasting over public data — weighted existing polls, structural fundamentals (demography, economy, historical turnout, the seat map), produced as a trajectory with explicit probability, falsifiers and tracked error. Tetlock / Good Judgment tradition.
IT · Aggregazione e forecasting probabilistico calibrato sopra dati pubblici — poll esistenti pesati, fondamentali strutturali (demografia, economia, affluenza storica, mappa dei seggi), prodotti come traiettoria con probabilità esplicita, falsifier ed errore tracciato a registro.
It is not polling. We collect no primary data — no samples, interviews, weighting. We are not a polling institute and do not claim to be: that would be overclaim. The competence is calibrated meta-analysis, not data collection.
IT · Non è demoscopia. Non raccogliamo dati primari — niente campioni, interviste, ponderazione. Non siamo un istituto di sondaggi e non lo rivendichiamo: la competenza è la meta-analisi calibrata, non la rilevazione.
It is not clandestine. All from open sources. No agency tradecraft, no "state-intelligence" pretence. Transparency is the competitive edge, not a limit: the track record is verifiable (see Calibration Record) — the opposite of a secret agency.
IT · Non è clandestino. Tutto da fonti aperte. Nessuna pretesa "stile intelligence statale". La trasparenza è il vantaggio: il track record è verificabile, l'opposto di un'agenzia segreta.
Pilot case · Caso pilota
— active forecast
▣ PET-US-2026 · FP3 forecasting · inference-graded
USA · Midterm 2026
Election Day · 3 November 2026 · [0—6M] · House (435) + Senate (33+2 special)
Vectors / drivers · Vettori
V1Midterm penalty — the President's party has lost House seats in 19 of 21 midterms since 1934 (avg ≈ −28). Strong prior. pro-Dem
IT · Penalità di midterm: il partito del Presidente perde seggi in 19 midterm su 21 dal 1934.
V2House margin R+~3 (218-214) — Dems need +3 seats. Low threshold: amplifies V1. pro-Dem
IT · Margine Camera R+~3: ai Dem bastano +3 seggi.
V32026 Senate map unfavorable to Dems — they defend Georgia and Michigan (Trump-won states); only serious GOP targets are Maine (Collins) + North Carolina (Tillis retired). Need +4. pro-GOP
IT · Mappa Senato sfavorevole: i Dem difendono GA e MI (stati Trump); servono +4.
V4Hispanic vote recomposition — does the 2024 rightward shift (Hispanic men) hold or revert? In midterms the presidential base tends to demobilize; slight Dem recovery plausible but uncertain. uncertain
IT · Voto ispanico: lo shift a destra del 2024 regge o rientra? Incerto.
V5Coalition fracture — MAGA vs traditional GOP turnout; Dem base mobilization. Enthusiasm asymmetry is the classic midterm multiplier. uncertain
IT · Frattura di coalizione: affluenza MAGA vs GOP tradizionale; asimmetria di entusiasmo.
V6Mid-decade redistricting (Texas, Ohio, others) — GOP counter-move dampening Dem House gains. Real 2025—26 wildcard. pro-GOP
IT · Redistricting di metà decennio: contromossa GOP che attenua i guadagni Dem.
V7Presidential approval + economy — Hormuz energy shock, imported inflation. If approval stays underwater, V1 amplifies. pro-Dem (conditional)
IT · Approval + economia: shock Hormuz, inflazione importata; sotto soglia, amplifica V1.
Chamber control probability · Probabilità di controllo
House majority · Camera
62%
Dem · GOP 38%
Senate majority · Senato
84%
GOP · Dem 16%
Combined control scenarios · Scenari combinati (Σ = 1.0)
Divided government · Dem House + GOP Senate — MODAL
48%
GOP holds both · tiene entrambe
36%
Dem take both — "disaster"
14%
GOP House + Dem Senate (tail)
2%
Falsifiers & early-warning · Falsifier
▸ Falsifiers (1) Dems fail +3 in the House despite a generic-ballot lead → base-rate model to revise. (2) GOP nets Senate seats → "Trump setback" thesis falsified. (3) Hispanic vote keeps shifting right in 2026 → V4 wrong.
IT · Falsifier: (1) Dem sotto +3 nonostante vantaggio; (2) GOP guadagna al Senato; (3) ispanici ancora a destra.
▸ EW#1 Generic congressional ballot (RCP/538 avg) · threshold D+5 · Tier-1.
▸ EW#2 Presidential approval · threshold <43% · Tier-1.
▸ EW#3 Special elections as leading signal — CA-01 (4 Aug 2026), FL & OH Senate specials (Nov 2026) · Tier-1.
▸ EW#4 Retirement wave Q2—Q3 2026 + redistricting court rulings (TX) · Tier-2.
▸ Calibration resolution 3.11.2026 · inference-graded conf. 70% · enters the Calibration Record on resolution.
◆ §17 verdict · the conclusion follows the data
The "disaster for Trump regardless" hypothesis is not supported unconditionally. The structure says two asymmetric things: probable House loss (midterm penalty + a 3-seat margin), improbable Senate loss (a map forcing Dems to win in Trump states). The modal outcome is divided government — a brake, not a rout. Full "disaster" — Dems in both chambers — is ~14%, real but minority. Honest headline: House at risk yes, Senate no. Whoever starts from the desired outcome is not forecasting; they are writing an op-ed.
IT · "Disastro comunque per Trump" non regge incondizionato: perdita Camera probabile, Senato improbabile. Modale = governo diviso. "Disastro" pieno ~14%. Camera a rischio sì, Senato no.
Pipeline · cycles in calibration · cicli in calibrazione
— P not yet set
Electoral cycles in progress. No pre-packaged outcomes: each slot gets its probability only once vectors are weighted and fundamentals gathered (§17). On resolution they flow into the Calibration Record.
IT · Cicli in lavorazione. Ogni slot riceve la P solo a vettori pesati (§17); alla risoluzione confluiscono nel Calibration Record.
apr 2027
France · Presidentials 2027 · PresidenzialiRN / central bloc / left recomposition — demographic vector + runoff · IT: ricomposizione blocchi, secondo turno
in calibration
2027
Italy · General election 2027 · PolitichePI-009: center-left wins 2027 P=12—18% · stable 5y govt 25—35% (cond.) · forced crisis 12—18M 50—60% · Vannacci/FN 5.9—7.2% · electoral law · snap election P 0.35—0.45
active · PI-009 · see ledger
TBD
Open slot · next international cycle · prossimo cicloSelection on B2B relevance + open-source density · IT: rilevanza committenza + densità fonti
pipeline
Product discipline · Disciplina del prodotto
Every trajectory is logged ex-ante with explicit probability, vectors, falsifiers, early-warning indicators and a resolution date. No twin scenarios to pick from afterwards, no adjectives in place of numbers. On resolution the forecast flows into the Calibration Record — hit or miss, scored with Brier.
IT · Ogni traiettoria registrata ex-ante con P, vettori, falsifier, EW e data. Niente doppi scenari, niente aggettivi al posto dei numeri.
The output is aggregation over public sources (Ballotpedia, Cook Political Report, poll averages, historical turnout, seat maps) plus structural fundamentals weighted by FP3 Method. No proprietary primary source is implied or claimed.
IT · Output: aggregazione su fonti pubbliche + fondamentali strutturali pesati dai protocolli FP3. Nessuna fonte primaria proprietaria.
FP3 Method (FP3 Method phases) · Indici (structured qualitative assessment
◉ DIREZIONE Direttore Responsabile · Dott. Iacopo Mutascio ODG Veneto · MODENART SRLS
AUDIT-READY FORECASTING · OSINT · NO PRE-PACKAGED OUTCOMES
Neither optimists nor pessimists. We take no side: we run the FP3 Method. Trajectories, not verdicts.
Né ottimisti né pessimisti. Non parteggiamo: applichiamo i protocolli FP3. Traiettorie, non verdetti.